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Abstract A series of terrorist attacks in late 2014 and early 2015 prompted the head of the UK’s
Security Service to comment on the need to improve the information flows available to the service
in order to deal with the emerging task demands that it faces. The comments highlighted the
tensions that have been created in the post-Snowden revelations around domestic surveillance and
intelligence gathering and these concerns span both public and private sector organisations. The
intervention by the head of MI5 raises a series of questions about the design of security organi-
sations and their function, and does so within a wider systems context, where changes in the
environment require corresponding changes in the core processes and functions of the organisa-
tion. This is a central domain of security ergonomics and the manner in which an organisation can
frame its response to an ever more complex threat matrix is the main purpose of this article. The
question becomes one of how one might ‘design’ such a high performing organisation and espe-
cially one that can satisfy the zero-failure mandate that is often required of the security function.
The argument presented here is that those organisations that see security as a ‘bolt-on’ function to
existing organisational activities will invariably fail to capture the wider strategic dynamics of
threat-response interactions and, more significantly, the role that other organisational activities
can play in shaping that process. This article approaches the question from the perspective of two
related bodies of research – Soft Systems Methodology and Ergonomics/Human Factors.
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Introduction
My sharpest concern as Director General of MI5 is the growing gap between the
increasingly challenging threat and the decreasing availability of capabilities to address
it (Parker, 2015)
The quote from Parker, the Director General of MI5, highlights the core challenge facing the
provision of a security function in modern organisations (and especially state-based security
institutions), namely to ensure that the capabilities of the organisation match the ever-
changing task demands that are imposed upon it. These threats currently include: the shift to
mass casualty suicide terrorism (especially where no warnings are given of the attack)
(Bowen, 2004; Fischbacher-Smith et al, 2010); the increasing threats from cyberattacks carried
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out by organised criminal gangs and state-actors (Choo and Smith, 2008; Farwell and
Rohozinski, 2011; Collins and McCombie, 2012); the increased use of social media to recruit
and train hostile actors; and the threats posed to those critical infrastructures upon which modern
societies depend (Boin and Smith, 2006). These threats have all increased the task complexity
associated with intelligence gathering and the protection of both organisations and nation-states.
If these security processes fail, then it is highly likely that the system will ‘fail to danger’ and in a
way that will have severe consequences. This process – essentially one of ‘breaking bad1, in
which relatively small failures have potentially disproportionality catastrophic consequences –
represents a core problem facing the provision of a security function. Essentially, the security
function seeks to prevent malicious attacks at the same time that the hostile attackers seek to by-
pass security controls. Against this background, a key question is how one might ‘design’ an
adaptive, high performing organisation that can satisfy the zero-failure mandate that is often
required of the security function. The aim in this article is to consider the implications of such a
systems-based approach for security, with a particular focus on the generation of strategic errors
in the design phase of developing security processes.
This article takes a strategic perspective to the design of the security workspace and
incorporates a systems ergonomics approach into that discussion. It seeks to develop a series
of frameworks that can be used to consider the task demands facing security organisations
and highlights some of the challenges that are inherent in framing security within an
organisational management paradigm. In particular, Cherns’ (1987) principles for the
analysis of systems design are presented as a means of highlighting the potential areas of
conflict that can exist in developing a high-performing security function. The arguments
presented here consider the provision of security from a more holistic perspective and
highlight the nature of task complexity and the challenges that it generates.
The main argument presented here is that organisations that see security as a ‘bolt-on’
function to existing organisational activities will invariably fail to capture the strategic
dynamics of threat-response interactions and, more significantly, the role that other
organisational activities can play in that process. This article approaches the question from
the perspective of two related bodies of research – Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) and
Ergonomics/Human Factors (E/HF). In particular, it seeks to frame the problem space that is
generated by a zero-failure mandate by using a SSM approach to structure the problem
(Checkland, 1985a, b, 1989; Checkland and Scholes, 1990). It develops this by considering
Cherns’ framework for the design of socio-technical systems and contextualising this
discussion in the wider E/HF literature. E/HF also has considerable potential to help frame
the security problems from a more holistic perspective and also to avoid the organisational
and agency stovepiping that can lead to fractures in controls, such as those present during the
September 11th attacks. As the security function has HF as a core, determining element of its
activities, then clearly E/HF has the ability to speak to the relationships between design, the
potential for error and the generation of vulnerabilities.
Designing a Security System From a Systems Perspective
If the intelligence community is interested in real improvement, it should begin with a
focus on process, not structure and function (Clark, 2013, p. xvi)
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Designing an effective security system from first principles requires an organisation to
ensure that its overall strategic and security goals are aligned in order to prevent any
incompatibility between them. Security, along with risk management, is essentially a
strategic process rather than simply an operational one. It is also an activity where the design
of its core processes needs to be undertaken from a holistic (systems) perspective.
A systems approach is based on the view that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts
(Reason, 1995; Jackson, 2000). As such, it seeks to frame the nature of the problems in a way
that recognises how changes in one part of the system can have wider implications for
organisational performance by destabilising control and performance measures elsewhere
(Smith, 2005). Defining the nature of the problem, and the processes needed to address the
associated task demands, is seen as the most important step in ensuring the effective
performance of the system. This holistic perspective contrasts with the reductionist approach
that often prevails within the analysis of complex phenomena. Recent research has argued
that: ‘it is the whole that determines the behavior of the parts’ (Capra and Luisi, 2014, p. 73)
and this highlights the importance of adopting a systems approach. In essence, a systems-
based approach highlights the importance of both the wider characteristics of the organisa-
tional processes and the nature of the environment in which the system is contextualised.
This provides a means of shaping performance and effectiveness at different levels of
granularity. As a first step in this process, it is important to define what is meant by the nature
of the system, especially within an organisational setting, and in doing so also to identify
some of the main parameters of the system being considered.
For our present purposes, we will adopt the following definition of a system:
a system is a set of interrelated elements which function together as an entity embedded
in an environment. The last condition above assumes that the system is open to some
external environment. In effect, the distinction of where the system proper ends and the
environment begins is arbitrary. A natural delimitation occurs only if a system is
completely closed within itself (Scheidegger, 1992, pp. 213–214).
This highlights one of the core challenges facing organisational security, namely the
permeable nature of the system-environment boundary. Many of the present security
challenges facing organisations arise out of the nature of those boundary conditions and the
difficulties that managers have in controlling that interface. The very nature of modern
organisations (that is, open, accessible and connected) creates potential vulnerabilities
through the interactions between people, technologies, politics and the economic structures
that serve to determine organisational effectiveness (Turner, 1994; Tsoukas, 1999; Hodge
and Coronado, 2007). Thus, any system has elements that interact together and this has the
effect of creating emergent properties that were not initially considered in the design of the
organisation’s defences and operating protocols. The result is the generation of potential
vulnerabilities in the systems defences that can serve to erode the capabilities of any
contingency planning process (Smith, 2005).
Within this broad context there are several aspects of a systems approach that have
relevance to this discussion and which need to be highlighted. Jackson (2000), for example,
argues that a systems approach has three key attributes:
● That a systems approach is holistic rather than reductionist and that this holistic
perspective allows for the greater consideration of emergent properties in any analysis
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(Jackson, 2000). There is also some acknowledgement that changing one part of the
system will have consequences elsewhere (Rockart and Scott-Morton, 1984; Galbraith,
2002; Lichtenstein and Plowman, 2009).
● That an advantage of a systems approach can be found in its interdisciplinary and inclusive
nature (Jackson, 2000) and that it invariably has a focus on real-world problems that are set
in what Wilson (2014) terms ‘ergonomics in the wild’ (p. 7).
● These systems are invariably structured according to the cognitive frameworks and
associated knowledge structures of humans (Jackson, 2000) and therefore the strategies
and decisions that we take are shaped by these worldviews (Checkland, 1989).
For many of these conceptualisations of the system, a common feature is that the core beliefs,
values and assumptions of key actors within the organisation lie at the heart of decision
making and strategy development (Checkland, 1989; Mitroff et al, 1989; Checkland and
Scholes, 1990; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992; Johnson, 1992) and are often seen as part of the
organisation’s wider cultural web in which the mental models of managers are important in
shaping their decision-making behaviours (Johnson, 1992; Hodgkinson and Johnson, 1994).
For example, Hollnagel (2001) has highlighted the importance of worldviews in conceptua-
lising a cognitive approach to ergonomics stating that:
… the defining characteristic of a cognitive system – and, therefore, also of a joint
cognitive system – is its ability to maintain control of what it does. Control is,
furthermore, not an isolated property of any identifiable part or component of a joint
cognitive system, but rather an emergent property of the system as such (Hollnagel,
2001, p. 312).
Hollnagel (2001, p. 314) also argues that as control is dynamic, ‘it requires a way to think of
and represent the dynamics and the forces of cognition, both how it can work and how it can
fail’. Given the importance of control processes to the performance of a security organisation
then it is clear that the core beliefs, values, and assumptions of key decision-makers need to
be articulated and incorporated into the design and maintenance of the systems core
processes.
From an early conceptualisation of systems ergonomics, a system can also be seen as a set
of interacting components where the interactions that take place involve the transfer of
information and energy (Singleton, 1967a). The centrality of humans in this process led
Singleton (1972) to argue that the application of human factors from a systems perspective is
an essential element in seeking to deal with the consequence of errors in an evermore
complex setting. Singleton (1967b) also highlighted three elements of a systems’ approach
that are relevant to a discussion of security ergonomics:
● the role of functional characteristics and their interactions in shaping systems performance
● the role and importance of human actors as an integral part of the system
● the ways in which decisions are taken around process and organisational design are
categorised and ordered as a means of ensuring that the goals of the system are consistently
borne in mind during any changes made to other systems elements (Singleton, 1967a, b).
Each of these factors has relevance to debates around the design of security functions within
organisations. Put another way, security needs to address a number of core questions:
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● What is the focus and purpose of the system and does this purpose vary in the perceptions
of the key actors involved?
● What is the potential for human error to arise within a system that is ever more complex
and how significant are the consequences of such errors?
● How do systems operators ensure that any moves away from the system’s ‘designed-for’
state are recognised and the potential for emergent conditions to erode controls is
acknowledged and managed?
There are a number of other important aspects of systems thinking including the shift in
focus from objects within the system to the relationships between those objects and the
processes that take place within these connecting elements (Capra, 1985; Capra and Luisi,
2014). Thus, the mapping of relationships and interconnections within the system can also be
deemed to be important, especially because it also gives rise to emergent conditions that arise
out these relationships. A logical extension of this argument is that where the implemented
processes and structures do not reflect the underlying task demands then there will be
considerable potential for the generation of negative emergent conditions that could prove
damaging (Capra and Luisi, 2014).
A systems approach also concerns the manner in which knowledge is constructed,
transferred and operationised within connected networks (Capra, 1985; Clark, 2013). In
particular, there is a shift away from the notion of a universally shared objective form of
knowledge and a move towards a more epistemic way of thinking in which the questions
asked of the system are important in framing the nature of understanding (Capra and Luisi,
2014). Once again, this places the assumptions and beliefs that the observers have about the
world – their worldviews and sensemaking processes (Checkland, 1989; Checkland and
Scholes, 1990; Weick, 1995; Weick, 2001) – as central elements for constructing and
managing the system. This also raises the potential for a dislocation in the ways that
emergent conditions are recognised and acted upon. What then are the opportunities that
exist for framing the processes around security and how can we recognise the central role
that human actors play in the process? The remainder of this paper considers an adapted
version of Cherns’ framework for socio-technical systems as a means of contextualising the
importance of a systems’ approach to security ergonomics.
Framing a System for Security
Humans invariably play a significant role in the provision of security where they can be
considered as occupying a number of roles – attackers, defenders and victims – as well as
acting as the designers and managers of the wider system. We can add to this the
categorisation developed by Checkland’s Soft Systems Methodology, where the human
elements of the system are seen in terms of those who make the system work, those who own
the system, and those who are the chief beneficiaries of the outputs of the system (Checkland,
1985a; Checkland, 1989; Checkland and Scholes, 1990). Each of these groups – actors,
owners and customers – have a particular set of worldviews (weltanshung) that serve to
shape the ways in which they make sense of the world around them (Checkland, 1989;
Checkland and Scholes, 1990). These worldviews reflect their core beliefs, values and
assumptions about the nature of the system and the various transformations that take place
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within it (Checkland, 1989; Weick, 1995; Weick, 2001). These groups of actors will require
the competence to undertake their core tasks (as attacker or defender), display the
commitment to make the function work (or, in the case of attackers, make it fail by by-
passing systems defences), and will also require a level of awareness around the performance
(transformations) of the system. These three issues (competence, commitment and aware-
ness) were identified by Reason (1993a) as core source types within the formation of an
organisational culture and which are seen to shape decision-making processes. While Reason
developed these source types in relation to issues around safety, it is our contention here that
they also apply to the provision of security. In making this link, we should note that security
is required to embrace even more uncertainty than many other risk and safety issues because
of the role that intentional actions play in the generation of harm. As such, it can be argued
that these source types assume a greater importance within a security context because of the
need to encompass this additional uncertainty.
We can place these source types at the core of our initial framework for a systems’
approach to security so that they interact with the core beliefs, values and assumptions
held by key actors, owners and customers within the organisation. This is shown in
Figure 1. Consensus around these issues will also be important in achieving the strategic
goals set for security and minimising conflict (or lack of consensus) across these three
source types in order to prevent fractures within control systems. Any deficiencies in
security competence, commitment and awareness may serve to amplify dislocations that
exist between the assumptions made about how the function operates in theory and how it
works in practice. Criticisms made in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks
highlighted the important roles played by differences in perceptions around systems
defences, information sharing and the significance of evidence in the performance of
security provision across organisational boundaries (Goodman, 2003; Posner, 2003;
Kean, 2011; Loftus, 2011). Many of these issues are often seen as intangible prior to a
systems failure and as a consequence they often lead to processes associated
with the incubation of risk (Turner, 1978; Reason, 1993b; Reason, 1995; Turner, 1994).
Figure 1: Epsitemic elements of developing a system.
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A key factor here concerns the compatibility of these elements within the context of the
wider strategic goals set out for the security function and the associated transformation
processes that take place elsewhere in the system.
The main elements of Figure 1 provide a means of asking key questions about the ways in
which it is possible to frame and evaluate the various elements of the security function within
a wider organisational system. A lack of competence, commitment, and awareness around
security-related tasks will be reflected in, and influenced by, the core beliefs, values and
assumptions held by key actors within the organisation as well as key stakeholders. These
processes will then shape the approaches taken to the development and implementation of
strategic goals and will also influence the willingness of individuals to engage in processes
around change management. The compatibility of these ‘hidden’ elements with the
organisation’s strategy represents a first, but crucial stage in the development of its
capabilities.
The notion of compatibility also sits at the core of Cherns’ (1976, 1987) framework as the
first of ten principles for the design of socio-technical systems and it is within this context
that the goals are set for the system. It is around the tensions that can exist in relation to
compatibility that any potential conflicts between the cultural core of the organisation and the
views of its principal stakeholders (that is, actors, customers and owners) needs to be
addressed:
we must recognize that design is an arena for conflict. It has to satisfy an array of
objectives, each represented by some organizational element: the way in which this
conflict is managed and used to yield positive results sets the pattern for the handling of
subsequent conflicts (Cherns, 1987, p. 154).
The potential for conflict can be seen, therefore, to sit at the core of the organisational design
process and can mitigate against the creation of a culture that supports a zero-failure
mandate. If there is no agreement or core compatibility around Reason’s three source types,
then it is likely that the potential for conflict will be high. Similarly, if the core beliefs, values
and assumptions of the key decision makers and other actors in the organisation are not
compatible, but these tensions remain hidden, then there is the potential for the incubation of
crisis to occur as a result (Reason, 1995; Turner, 1976; Reason, 1997). For these reasons, the
elements outlined in Figure 1 form the basis of our framing of Cherns’ (1987) wider
principles and this revised framework is shown in Figure 2. Figure 2 allows us to consider
how the notion of compatibility, where we have situated Reason’s source types, can impact
on the rest of Cherns’ principles for the design of socio-technical systems. We can now
consider the remaining principles in turn.
Minimum critical specification
Building on the core issue of compatibility, a significant issue within any systems design
process concerns the notion of a minimum critical specification for performance. Cherns
(1987) argues that organisations typically set this specification in terms of either a negative
position (that is, restricting the performance criteria to those issues that are absolutely
essential) or a positive one (that is, where the various task requirements associated with
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managing the system are identified completely). From a security perspective, this raises some
interesting challenges.
The provision of security is a complex process because of the multiple interactions that
take place at both the level of the threat and the organisational defences that are in place to
deal with the task demands that those threats generate. Security is also complicated because
of the need to generate intelligence around the range of multi-layered threats that an
organisation faces, and then to convert that intelligence into actionable knowledge that
allows for risks to be identified and managed. Taken together, this complex and complicated
nature of security generates variety within the threats that need to be ‘managed’. The variety
within the threats will require corresponding levels of variety within the control measures put
in place to deal with those threats (Ashby, 1958). Reductionist approaches to dealing with
the threats will invariably increase the potential for emergent conditions by failing to
consider how localised changes will move the security process away from its ‘designed-for’
Figure 2: Cherns’ principles of the design of sociotechnical systems.
Source: based on information in Cherns (1987).
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state without taking account of these changes on the performance of the system as a whole.
This creates challenges for security management, especially where the organisation has a
‘zero-failure mission’ (Hagin et al, 2014).
Another reason why zero-failures may be problematic is that the performance challenges
for security occur in what has been termed a hyper-competitive environment (D’Aveni,
1995, 1998). Here, processes around globalisation generate challenges for controlling
security in organisations because of the extent of the organisation’s networks and their
significance. The extent of an organisation’s supply chains and its dependence on key
sources of raw materials may make it vulnerable to international conflicts. Closer to home, a
dependence on critical infrastructures can also generate vulnerabilities that lie outside of the
organisation’s control. Given the role of human actors in generating many of these threats,
the process can be likened to ‘predator-prey’ relationships in which the relative fitness of
both parties to deal with each other’s capabilities will be a determining factor in their ability
to achieve their goals. These conflicts occur at different scales and in different locations,
thereby requiring the security function to operate optimally at various points in space and
time. The result of such competition has generated what has been termed a ‘hyper-conflict’
environment in which the processes around globalisation have created a threatening context
in which organisations operate (Mittelman, 2010, 2011). In turn, this has created a series of
security challenges around information management and sharing, the protection of extended
supply chains, and a set of problems around personnel checking and insider threats that
emerge out of this wider globalisation process. While a global pool of expertise and human
resource talent brings obvious benefits to recruiting organisations, it also increases the task
requirements around background checking in order to prevent risks from insider threats
(Day, 2007; Hershkowitz, 2007; Harber, 2009).
Figure 3 provides a generic illustration of the nature of such a hypercompetitive
environment and highlights a range of issues that have implications for security across
economic, political, technological and organisational dimensions. The interactions between
these elements has the potential to generate the potential for hyper-conflict along with new
and emergent threats that the organisation has yet to consider.
Variance control
It is not inconceivable that an organisation charged with providing security will have to deal
with a sizable proportion of the issues highlighted in Figure 3. The security function will
have to control the variance that exists across its threat environment and ensure that it has the
processes in place to deal with the challenges that these threats generate. Variance control is
an important factor in ensuring that the defences in place across the organisation are
universally robust and that local adaptations have not been allowed to erode their capability.
Variance control is also a key element of dealing with the potential for latent conditions
(Reason, 1990, 1997) that can allow errors or violations to by-pass organisational controls.
The actions of externally generated threats also creates a range of other challenges around
information flows, boundary spanning processes and the power to obtain information. These
issues form the next three principles outlined by Cherns, namely: boundary location,
information flows and power and authority.
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Boundary location
Security challenges invariably transcend organisational boundaries and especially within a
global, hyper-competitive environment. Boundary location is, therefore, an important element
of performance and it can be seen to operate at a range of spatial and functional levels.
Operating across geographical boundaries opens up the potential for threats within an
organisation’s supply chain. This, in turn, transcends multiple legal jurisdictions and requires
the organisation to develop effective working relationships with the relevant legal systems
involved. The recent hacking of Sony’s networks illustrated how the boundaries between the
state and organisational provision of security have become increasingly intertwined (see:
Michal, 1994). The scale and complexity of these interactions also generates the potential for
emergence as well as a requirement to improve information flows and intelligence gathering
capabilities. Increasingly, this needs to be done across public–private sector boundaries,
although this generates problems around information sharing. In a globalised environment, the
spatial dynamics for the provision of security is problematic, especially where the threats are
generated by non-state actors and because of the increasing interdependence of the state on
trans-national corporations (Mittelman, 2010). As a consequence, security theory is no longer
as dominated by the focus on international relations as it has been in the past and this also
generates challenges around the conceptualisation of security. One effect of this broadening of
the boundaries of security theory has been to increase the demands around information
processing. It is increasingly apparent that both public and private sector information sources
are important in dealing with the task demands associated with the provision of security,
especially around the protection of the privatised utilities (Boin and Smith, 2006).
Figure 3: Hyper-competition and hyper-conflict.
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Information flows
Information flows and the processes by which information is converted into actionable
intelligence and knowledge are a major challenge for organisations but this is especially
important where the provision of security is a primary task (Waltz, 2003). While many seem
content to share a great deal of personal information through social media, they are unhappy
at attempts by the state to collect metadata in pursuit of a security policy agenda that became
public knowledge as a result of the Snowden revelations (Etzioni, 2015; Friedersdorf, 2014;
Greenwald, 2014). Similarly, revelations around ‘enhanced interrogations’ after the Septem-
ber 11th attacks have also been heavily criticised, despite the horrific nature of the attacks
themselves, especially as the actionable intelligence that was derived remains contentious
(Halpern et al, 2008; Schiemann, 2012; US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2012).
Supporters of enhanced interrogation and increased surveillance invariably argue that we are
dealing with a set of threat actors that do not conform to accepted social norms and therefore
extraordinary measures are needed by the state to deal with the task demands of that threat: in
essence, a process that could be seen as akin to an application of the Law of Requisite
Variety. Opponents argue that such measures erode the principles of a free, democratic
society and that such oppressive measures simply bring us down to the same level as those
who would threaten us (Bellamy, 2006; Guiora and Page, 2006).
This political impasse encapsulates the challenge facing security operators dealing with
the threats from violent extremists and organised crime. Echoes of this can also be found in
debates around intrusive monitoring of employees through social media and email traffic
(Hoffman et al, 2003; Slovensky and Ross, 2012) and reflects a wider set of concerns around
the power of companies and the state.
Power and authority
The ability to use power and authority to shape policy and practice within organisations is often
a significant challenge for the security function. Within many organisations, the security
function often does not hold a position that allows it to shape, align and influence the overall
corporate strategies and goals that are required to deal with the threats. Moving towards the
provision of a zero-failure performance standard would require the security function to extend
its influence across the various operating divisions of the organisation. This would necessitate
the creation of effective processes around communication and information sharing as well as
the implementation of an extensive programme of cultural change in some cases. Thus,
security would have to move beyond its normal remits – with a focus on detection and
prevention of threats – to encompass a cultural change agenda and risk communication
mandate. This is likely to prove challenging, especially when working with an extended
network of partner organisations. The security function would need to embrace the multi-
functional principle that forms the next element in Cherns framework.
Multifunctional principle and support congruence
The multifunctional principle reflects a significant challenge for an organisation as it seeks to
adapt to its threats, especially within a diminishing resource base. This invariably leads
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organisations to increase the utilisation of existing resources, thereby increasing the task demands
on staff who assume multi-functional roles as a consequence. This also relates to the issue of
support congruence, where security functions within the organisation need to be supported along
with the processes by which the performance of those functions is measured and rewarded. This
also relates to the importance of expertise within those processes that support the security
function. Within a globalised environment, these challenges extend over extended spatial scales
and across multiple cultures. As a result, the risk of information loss is considerably heightened
unless the supporting elements of the system are adequately resourced.
Transnational organisation and the incompletion principle
The last two elements in Chern’s framework relate to the processes of managing change and
dealing with the task demands associated with emergent conditions. The first of these is the
notion of the transitional organisation. Here, the organisation is in a process of continuous change
(or adaptation) and these processes can have an impact on the performance of organisational
defences as the system is moved away from its ‘designed-for’ state. Changes around the
configuration of the system will invariably lead to the creation of emergent conditions and these,
in turn, can lead to fractures in controls (Perrow, 1984; Tsoukas, 1999; Smith, 2005; Hodge and
Coronado, 2007). Finally, the on-going demand for providing security underpins the incomple-
tion principle. Here the emergent conditions and evolution of the threat matrix facing an
organisation will ensure that those threats will always challenge the capabilities of the
organisation to contain, identify and neutralise them. The provision of security will always be
an incomplete task as threat actors seek to identify and exploit on-going systemic weaknesses.
Against this background, the provision of security needs to take account of the dynamics
of the process from a more holistic perspective if it is to be effective. It also needs to account
for the motivations of those individuals and groups who threaten the organisation. Given that
most, if not all, security threats are generated by intelligent actors (who actively seek to cause
harm), then the provision of sufficient controls to deal with the variety in the threats remains
a considerable challenge. It requires the organisation to improve its knowledge management
processes and to ensure that decision makers recognise the impact that their actions can have
on shaping the threats that the organisation faces. Similarly, organisational performance can
be seen as a function of task complexity which is generated by the environment in which it
operates. Organisational effectiveness, and by implication security performance, is an
essentially fragile process and it is a function of the reluctance of many managers to see the
double-edge nature of the effectiveness construct and its relationship with failure
(Fischbacher-Smith, 2014a, b). Thus, the worldviews that are held by those who ‘own’ the
system are important in determining the design parameters in which the system works
(Checkland, 1989; Checkland and Scholes, 1990).
Discussion
Thus far, we have argued a case for a systems-based approach to dealing with organisational
security and have set out the framework developed by Cherns as a means of conceptualising
the main steps that are needed within such an approach. The framework, developed in
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Figure 2 above, also raises some questions about organisational effectiveness and we can
now explore those issues in more detail.
One of the core elements of developing an effective security provision concerns the creation
of an organisational culture (expressed in terms of Reason’s source types) that recognises the
limitations that can be embedded within that culture because of a failure to consider the level of
consensus around the commitment, competence and awareness of key decision makers. It
could also be argued that there will also be a need to surface the core beliefs, values and
assumptions that underpin the development of the organisation’s strategic goals as this will
ensure that key decision makers are fully aware of the basis for the decision. A failure to
deliver this core aim will result in the embedding of weaknesses into the design of security
processes and structures that is akin to Turner’s (1976, 1978, 1994) notion of incubation.
As the organisation evolves, it will be necessary to revisit this cultural core to ensure that there
is still an effective mapping of these elements against the strategic goals of the organisation.
Building upon this cultural core, the essence of Cherns’ framework is based upon a series
of interconnected elements that begin with the development of a critical specification for the
main processes used to develop security capabilities. It is here that any zero-failure standard
would need to be specified and the organisation would also need to ensure that this standard
was compatible with the other strategic goals that were in place. Once the standards are
established and agreed across the organisation (and its network partners if appropriate) then
the organisation needs to be certain that it has established and tested mechanisms for the
control of variance within the system. This will be important in developing the parameters of
the control systems that are in place and establishing the boundaries of the system over which
such controls need to function. Framing the boundaries of the system is an essential element
in ensuring that gaps within the control parameters are addressed and this is especially
important for organisations that operate across multiple locations. Finally, ensuring effective
information flows is also an essential component of an effective security system. This is often
problematic for organisations where the information required to achieve a high level of
security performance is sensitive and, therefore, not easily shared with others in the
organisation’s network. In addition, all organisations invariably suffer from constrained
information flows (Fischbacher-Smith, 2014a, b), and this is especially problematic when
dealing with the identification of early warnings and weak signals that are an essential
component of intelligence gathering. Any failures around variance control, boundary
location, and information sharing will severely impair the organisation’s attempts at
developing a zero-failure performance standard. The ability to achieve and maintain
effectiveness in this regard is often a function of the power and authority given to security
managers to override lapses in performance in other parts of the organisation. Again, this is
an organisational characteristic that can change over time, resulting in the erosion of
organisational capability.
Figure 4 seeks to contextualise Cherns’ elements as part of a wider process around the
creation and erosion of organisational effectiveness. The key elements around effectiveness
have, at their core, the essential requirement around the compatibility of security goals with
the main strategic objectives of the organisation. It is here that the organisation needs to
ensure that it achieves consensus around the source types of commitment, awareness and
competence. It is only by surfacing the core assumptions, beliefs and values that key actors
hold, that assurances can given around the compatibility of security with the wider strategic
goals. At the same time, it is important to try and understand the core beliefs, values and
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assumptions of those hostile actors who are likely to pose a threat to the organisation. The
gaps that exist between these two sets of variables will provide the basis for an initial
assessment of vulnerabilities within the system. This then allows managers to pay attention
to the key elements of the framework (Stages 2–5) that are essential in achieving
organisational effectiveness. Each of these elements builds on the platform provided by the
previous element. Stages 2 to 5 are, therefore, the essential and non-substitutable elements in
the design of effective security processes. A failure in any one of these elements will lead to
the potential erosion of the controls that are put in place to deal with threats. These opening
stages will, however, only provide a baseline for the development of security capability.
If the security function does not have the power and authority to challenge any
incompatibilities within the organisation’s strategic goals, or to help change the relative
priorities that the organisation has around security, then it will begin to incubate the potential
for failure. Similarly, if the security function does not develop the multifunctional
capabilities required to deal with a diverse and evolving threat matrix, as well as to ensure
that it has the skills and capabilities to promote the security agenda across the organisation,
then it will struggle to effect a cultural change process. The multifunctional principle will
also require an extensive training programme for staff to develop the capabilities needed to
operate within a multi-threat environment. This multifunctional capability is seen as being an
essential component for organisations working within a complex environment where the
need to adapt to changing task demands is high (Cherns, 1987). Similarly, the need to
Figure 4: Incorporating effectiveness into the Cherns framework.
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provide support for the goals of security is also an important element in ensuring that the
organisation does not become ineffective. This will invariably require changes to the reward
system within the organisation while ensuring that other organisational goals do not
undermine the support for a security agenda. A failure to deal with strategic drift within the
organisation will ultimately lead to a transitional process that moves the organisation into an
ineffective state and which will lead to a failure (as incompletion) of the strategy, thereby
requiring the redevelopment of the process from first principles.
The Cherns’ framework provides a systematic way of considering the development of an
organisation’s security strategy and it highlights the importance of a systems approach to
dealing with the problems that can arise from security threats. Unless organisations take a
holistic and adaptive approach to dealing with the demands of the threat matrix that they face
then they will risk creating a set of security processes that fail to deal with those task
demands. It is also necessary for the principles set out by Cherns to be constantly reassessed
to ensure that the capabilities to deal with evolving threats are in place. While these
principles will not guarantee a zero-failure level of performance, it will provide a more
systematic way of developing capabilities that provide an organisation with the potential to
move ever closer to that goal.
Conclusions
There is little doubt that the provision of security, both within and across organisational
networks as well as throughout a range of societal settings, is a complex and complicated
task. The complexity of the security task arises from the scale of the threats involved, the
manner in which those threats emerge, and the problems that exist in the responses that the
organisation makes to contain those threats. The security task is made even more complex
because of the nature of the threats that arise from the direct actions of hostile human actors.
Unlike most other forms of risk, the majority of security threats are not accidental but are
intentional, where the perpetrators of the act seek to by-pass existing control measures to
cause a range of harms.
This article has sought to argue the case for a systems ergonomics approach to dealing
with the task demands associated with the provision of security and has outlined a process by
which it is possible to identify some of the main points of fracture that can be generated by
taking a narrow reductionist approach to developing the security function. The article has, at
the same time, also outlined some areas where additional research is needed to develop both
the theoretical and the practical aspects of security ergonomics in order to deal with the ever-
evolving set of threats that organisations face. Perhaps more than any other function within
an organisation, security is subject to the transitional and incomplete nature of change that
was outlined by Cherns. The constantly evolving threat matrix and the increasingly adaptive
nature of hostile actors ensures that a systems approach to this problem is a requirement that
organisations ignore at their cost. This creates some highly demanding issues for those
involved in the design of security organisations for, as Carayon notes:
Increasing work system complexity poses unique challenges to the people involved in
the design, implementation and maintenance of sociotechnical systems (Carayon, 2006,
p. 525).
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A systems approach to dealing with security ergonomics can be seen as an effective way of
approaching this task complexity because, as Cherns reminds us, taking a piecemeal
approach to such issues will invariably lead to problems around those incomplete elements
that arise from more reductionist approaches.
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Note
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to commentaries on Wall Street activities in 1919. The term was popularised in the United States by the TV series
relating to the production of crystal meth.
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